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Abstract— In 2002, Chien–Jan–Tseng introduced an efficient remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards. Further, in 2004, W. C. Ku and S. M. Chen 
proposed an efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards to solve the 
security problems of Chien et al.’s scheme. Recently, Hsu and Yoon et al. pointed out the 
security weakness of the Ku and Chen’s scheme Furthermore, Yoon et al. modified the 
password change phase of Ku and Chen’s scheme and they also proposed a new efficient 
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. This paper analyzes that the 
modified scheme of Yoon et al. still vulnerable to parallel session attack. 
Keywords — Cryptography, Cryptanalysis, Network security, Authentication, Smart cards, 
Password, Parallel session attack. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To gain the access rights on an authentication server (AS) a password based 
remote user authentication schemes is used. The remote user makes a login request 
with the help of some secret information which are provided by the AS. On the 
other side the AS checks the validity of a login request made by a remote user U. 
In these schemes, the AS and the remote user U share a secret, which is often 
called as password. With the knowledge of this password, the remote user U uses 
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it to create a valid login request to the AS.  AS checks the validity of the login 
request to provide the access rights to the user U. Password authentication 
schemes with smart cards have a long history in the remote user authentication 
environment. So far different types of password authentication schemes with 
smarts cards [3] - [4] - [5] - [6] - [12] - [13] - [14] - [18] - [20] - [21] - [24] - [29] 
have been proposed. 
Lamport [17] proposed the first well-known remote password authentication 
scheme using smart cards. In Lamport’s scheme, the AS stores a password table at 
the server to check the validity of the login request made by the user. However, 
high hash overhead and the necessity for password resetting decrease the 
suitability and practical ability of Lamport’s scheme. In addition, the Lamport 
scheme is vulnerable to a small n attack [7]. Since then, many similar schemes 
[23]-[26] have been proposed. They all have a common feature: a verification 
password table should be securely stored in the AS. Actually, this property is a 
disadvantage for the security point of view. If the password table is stolen 
/removed /modified by the adversary, the AS will be partially or totally 
braked/affected. 
In 2002, Chien–Jan–Tseng [13] introduced an efficient remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards. In 2004, Ku and Chen [31] pointed out 
some attacks [7]-[28]-[30] on Chien – Jan and Tseng’s scheme. According to Ku 
and Chen, Chien et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to a reflection attack [7] and an 
insider attack [30]. Ku and Chen claimed that Chien et al.’s scheme is also not 
reparable [30]. In addition, they also proposed an improved scheme to prevent the 
attacks: reflection attack and an insider attack on Chien–Jan–Tseng’s scheme. In 
the same year, Hsu [10] pointed out that the Chien–Jan–Tseng’s scheme is still 
vulnerable to a parallel session attack and Yoon et al. [11] claimed that the 
password change phase of improved scheme of Chien–Jan–Tseng’s scheme is still 
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insecure.   
A.  Contributions 
This paper analyzes that the modified scheme of Yoon et al. is still vulnerable to 
parallel session attack.  
B. Organization 
Section II reviews the Ku and Chen’s scheme [31]. Section III reviews Hsu [10] 
and Yoon et al.’s comments on Ku and Chen’s scheme .Section IV reviews Yoon 
et al.’s scheme [11]. Section V is about our observations on the security pitfall of 
Yoon et al.’s scheme. Finally, comes to a conclusion in the section VI. 
II. REVIEW OF KU AND CHEN’S SCHEME 
This section briefly describes Ku and Chen’s scheme [31]. This scheme has four 
phases: the registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the password 
change phase. All these four phases are described below. 
A. Registration Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U initially or re-registers to AS. Let n denotes 
the number of times U re-registers to AS. The following steps are involved in this 
phase. 
Step.R1:   User U selects a random number b and computes PWS = f (b ⊕ PW) and 
submits her/his identity ID and PWS to the AS through a secure channel. 
Step.R2:  AS computes a secret number R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ PWS, where EID = 
(IDn) and creates an entry for the user U in his account database and 
stores n = 0 for initial registration, otherwise set n= n+1, and n denotes 
the present registration. 
Step.R3:   AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The 
smart card contains the secret number R and a one-way function f. 
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Step.R4:   User U enters his random number b into his smart card. 
B.  Login Phase 
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then 
keys the identity and the password to gain the access services. The smart card will 
perform the following operations:  
Step.L1:   Computes C1= R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) and C2 = f (C1 ⊕ TU).   Here TU denotes 
the current date and time of the smart card reader. 
Step.L2:     Sends a login request C = (ID, C2, TU) to the AS. 
C. Verification Phase 
  Assume AS receives the message C at time TS, where TS  is the current date and 
time at AS. Then the AS takes the following actions: 
Step.V1:   If the identity ID and the time TU are not valid, then     AS will rejects 
this login request. 
Step.V2:  Checks, if C2 
?
=  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TU), then the AS accepts the login 
request and computes C3 = f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS). Otherwise, the login 
request C will be rejected. 
Step.V3:  AS sends the pair (C3, TS) to the user U for mutual authentication.  
Step.V4: If the time TS is invalid i.e. TU = TS, then U terminates the session. 
Otherwise, the user U verifies the equation C3 
?
=  f (C1 ⊕ TS) to 
authenticate AS. 
D. Password Change Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new 
password, say PWnew. This phase has the following steps. 
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Step.P1: U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader keys the identity and 
the password and then requests to change the password. Next, U enters a 
new password PWnew. 
Step.P2: U’s smart cards computes a new secret number Rnew = R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) ⊕ 
f (b ⊕ PWnew) and then replaces R with Rnew. 
III. REVIEW OF HSU AND YOON ET AL.’S COMMENT ON THE KU AND CHEN’S 
SCHEME 
A. Hsu’s Comment 
According to Hsu, Ku and Chen’s scheme is vulnerable to a parallel session 
attack [10].  The intruder Bob intercepts the communication between the AS and 
user U and then from this intercepted information, he makes a valid login request 
to masquerade as a legal user. The intruder Bob applies the following steps for a 
successful parallel session attack.    
 Intercepts the login request C = (ID, C2, TU) which is sent by a valid user U 
to AS. 
 Intercepts the response message (C3, TS ), which is sent by AS to the user U.  
 Starts a new session with the AS by sending a fabricated login request Cf = 
(ID, C3, TS).  
The fabricated login request passes all the requirements for a successful 
authentication of the intruder Bob by the AS, due to the fact that the second part , 
C3 , of the login request also satisfies the verification equation C3 
?
=  f (f (EID ⊕ x) 
⊕ TS ). 
 Finally, AS computes C4 = f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS) and responses with the message 
pair (T*S, C4) to the user U for mutual authentication, where is the current 
timestamp of the AS. Thus, the intruder intercepts and drops this message  
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B. Yoon et al.’s Comment on Ku and Chen’s Scheme 
 According to Yoon et al., the password change phase of Ku and Chen’s scheme 
is insecure. When the smart card was stolen, an authorized user can easily replace 
the old password by a new password of her/his choice. First, the authorized user 
inters the smart card into the smart card reader, enters the identity ID and any 
password PW*
 
of her/his choice and then requests to change the password. Next, 
the authorized user enters a new password PW*new and then the smart card 
computes a new R*new = R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW*) ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW*new) and then replaces R 
with R*new, without any checking. 
Thus, if the malicious user stole the user U’s smart card once, only for a small 
time and then change the valid password with an arbitrary password PW* , then 
the registered/ legal user U also will not be able to make a valid login request. The 
AS will not authenticate a registered user U, because C2 ≠  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TU) in 
the verification phase. 
IV. YOON ET AL.’S SCHEME 
This section briefly describes Yoon et al.’s scheme [11]. This scheme also has 
four phases: the registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the 
password change phase. All these four phases are described below. 
A. Registration Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U initially or re-registers to AS. Let n denotes 
the number of times U re-registers to AS. The following steps are involved in this 
phase. 
 User U selects a random number b and computes PWS = f (b ⊕ PW) and 
submits her/his identity ID and PWS to the AS through a secure channel. 
MANOJ KUMAR: THE MODIFIED SCHEME IS STILL VULNERABLE TO PARALLEL 
SESSION ATTACK 
7 
 AS computes two secret numbers V =  f (EID ⊕ x) and  R = f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ 
PWS, where EID = (IDn) and creates an entry for the user U in his account 
database and stores n = 0 for initial registration, otherwise set n= n+1, and n 
denotes the present registration. 
 AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart 
card contains two secret numbers V, R and a one-way function f. 
 User U enters her/his random number b into his smart card. 
B. Login Phase 
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then 
keys the identity and the password to gain access services. The smart card will 
perform the following operations:  
 Computes C1= R ⊕ f (b ⊕ PW) and C2 = f (C1 ⊕ TU). Here TU denotes the 
current date and time of the smart card reader. 
 Sends a login request C = (ID, C2, TU) to the AS. 
C. Verification Phase 
  Assume AS receives the message C at time TS, where TS is the current date and 
time at AS. Then the AS takes the following actions: 
 If the identity ID and the time TU   is invalid i.e. TU =TS, then AS will rejects 
this login request. 
 Checks, if C2 
?
=  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TU), then the AS accepts the login request 
and computes C3 = f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS). Otherwise, the login request C will 
be rejected. 
 AS sends the pair (C3, TS) to the user U for mutual authentication.  
 If the time TS is invalid i.e. TU =TS, then U terminates the session. Otherwise, 
U verifies the equation C3 
?
=  f (C1 ⊕ TS ) to authenticates AS. 
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D. Password Change Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new 
one, say PWnew. This phase has the following steps. 
 U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys her/his 
identity and the old password PW and then requests to change the password.  
 U’s smart cards computes V* = R ⊕   f (b ⊕ PW). 
 Compare this calculated value V* with the secret value V, which is stored in 
the smart card of the user U. If they are equal, then U can select a new 
password PWnew, otherwise the smart card rejects the password change 
request. 
 U’s smart cards computes a new secret number Rnew = V*  ⊕ f (b ⊕ PWnew) 
and then replaces R with Rnew. 
V. OUR OBSERVATION: PARALLEL SESSION ATTACK ON YOON ET AL.’S 
SCHEME   
Although, Yoon et al. [11] modified Ku and Chen’s scheme to remove its 
security weaknesses against parallel session attack. But, we analyze that the 
modified scheme of Yoon et al. is still vulnerable parallel session attack. This 
following section proves our claim that the modified scheme is still vulnerable a 
parallel session attack by an intruder. 
Since, a remote user password authentication is used to authenticate the 
legitimacy of the remote users over an insecure channel. Thus, an intruder Bob is 
able to intercept all the communication between the AS and user U and then from 
this intercepted information, he makes a valid login request to masquerade as a 
legal user. The intruder Bob applies the following steps for a successful parallel 
session attack on Yoon et al.’s scheme.   
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 Intercepts the login request C = (ID, C2, TU) which is sent by a valid 
user U to AS. In this login request C, the time TU is the current time of 
the smart card reader, whenever the user U makes the login request. 
 Intercepts the response message (C3, TS), which is sent by AS to he user 
U. In this response message, the time TS in the current time at the AS, 
when AS receives the login request C. 
 Starts a new session with the AS by sending a fabricated login request 
Cf = (ID, C3, TS).  
Upon, receiving the fabricated login request Cf = (ID, C3, TS), at time TS*, where 
TS* is the current date and time at AS. The AS performs the following steps to 
ensure the validity of the received login request. 
 Checks the validity of the format of the identity ID and the time TU i.e. 
TS* ≠ TS. Both these conditions hold true, because the intruder has been 
used a previously registered identity ID and obviously the time TS* will 
be different from the time TS.  
 Checks, the verification equation C3 
?
=  f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ TS), which is 
also holds truly. The logic behind the successful verification of this 
phase is very interesting. If we observe login and verification phase of 
Yoon et al.’s scheme, then it makes a sense that the second part C2 of 
the login request C = (ID, C2, TU) and the first part C3 of the response 
message (C3, TS) are computed by the same procedure and with similar 
information.  
 AS sends the pair TS and C3 to the user U for mutual authentication.  
 If the time TS is invalid i.e. TU = TS, then U terminates the session. 
Otherwise, U verifies the equation C3 
?
=  f (C1 ⊕ TS) to authenticate AS. 
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 Finally, AS computes C4 = f (f (EID ⊕ x) ⊕ T*S) and responses with the 
message pair (C4, T*S) to the user U for mutual authentication, where 
T*S is the current timestamp of the AS. Thus, the intruder intercepts and 
drops this message  
In this way, the fabricated login request Cf = (ID, C3, TS), which is made by the 
intruder, satisfies the all the requirements for a successful authentication of the 
intruder Bob by the AS.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
This paper analyzed the modified scheme of Yoon et al.’s scheme is still 
vulnerable to the parallel session attack. As, we have observed that Yoon et al. 
just consider the security problems in the password change phase of Ku and 
Chen’s scheme and repaired that phase only.  They again presented a modified 
scheme with same security parameters as it was with previous security parameters. 
Thus, the security pitfalls are still exists in Yoon et al.’s scheme. 
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